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For at least half a century, scholars of the early American Constitution 
have noted the archival prominence of a doctrine known as the “federal 
consensus.”  This doctrine instructed that Congress had no power to 
interfere with the institution of slavery in the states where it existed.  Despite 
its ubiquity in the records, our understanding of how and why this doctrine 
emerged is hazy at best.  Working from a conceptual map of America’s 
founding that features thirteen local governments coalescing into two 
feuding sections of North and South, commentators have tended to explain 
the federal consensus either as a vestige of a much older constitutional 
tradition rooted in localism or as the result of a brokered political 
compromise between the sections.  Cast as an archaic relic of the colonial 
era or as a one-off political compromise, the doctrine has appeared in the 
most recent scholarship as one that by the mid-1800s had devolved into a 
limp and unpersuasive rhetorical disclaimer. 
This Essay offers a different origins story for the federal consensus, one 
that invites us to re-center the doctrine’s central importance in the founding 
constitutional order.  Drawing on a model of inquiry that expands the 
conventional map of America’s founding to include the material modes of 
production and exchange, this Essay allows us to see how the bedrock 
principle of noninterference emerged not only from the oft cited vestiges of 
localism and sectionalism but also from the customary practices and 
exigencies of long-distance maritime trade in the Atlantic world.  As 
economic historians have shown, long before the doctrine appeared in print 
in 1790, America’s merchant class had forged a trading network along the 
Atlantic coast, creating an interregional economy that spanned from the 
Massachusetts Bay to the plantation coast and outer-lying islands.  
Predicated on a rule of noninterference with the underlying modes of 
enslaved labor on which white wealth depended, these preexisting norms of 
racialized property ownership and commercial exchange provided a useful 
starting point for the rules of constitutional union at a time when the concepts 
and structures of public law constitutional governance in the newly created 
United States remained inchoate and ill-defined. 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.  This Essay was prepared for the 
Symposium entitled The Federalist Constitution, hosted by the Fordham Law Review on 
October 2, 2020, at Fordham University School of Law. 
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By recovering this genealogy and expanding our map of the founding, this 
Essay offers a more complete view of the origins of one of the oldest and most 
consequential rules of constitutional union.  In doing so, it allows us to see 
the institution of racial slavery not simply as one confined to a single section 
of the South and upheld by its peculiar doctrine of states’ rights but as a 
fundamentally American institution, one upheld by a rule of federal and state 
inaction in the face of slavery’s systemic taking of Black lives. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the early months of 1790, members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives gathered in the temporary seat of government in New York 
City and announced a constitutional doctrine that would sound in the halls of 
national governance and courts of adjudication for decades to come.1  The 
doctrine, laid down in a committee report drafted in response to a petition by 
the Pennsylvania Abolition Society,2 declared that the newly created 
Congress of the United States had no power to interfere with the institution 
of slavery in the states where it existed.3  Termed the “federal consensus” by 
a legal scholar who caught sight of it in the archives in the 1970s, this rule of 
noninterference reverberated across the long nineteenth century.4  Today, one 
can see it coursing through the records of subsequent congressional debates,5 
hear its logic at work in the judicial opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court,6 
and observe from afar as it provided the opening script for a newly elected 
president who, on the eve of the Civil War, offered a solemn promise that in 
 
 1. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1524 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
 2. Memorial of the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery to the 
Senate and House of Representatives of the United States (Feb. 3, 1790), as transmitted in 
Letter from Benjamin Franklin to John Adams (Feb. 9, 1790) (on file with the National 
Archives). 
 3. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1524 (1790) (“That Congress have no authority to interfere in the 
emancipation of slaves, or in the treatment of them within any of the States; it remaining with 
the several States alone to provide any regulations therein, which humanity and true policy 
may require.”). 
 4. See JAMES OAKES, FREEDOM NATIONAL:  THE DESTRUCTION OF SLAVERY IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1861–1865, at 2–8 (2013); DONALD ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE 
OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 1765–1820 (1970); GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A SLAVEHOLDERS’ 
UNION:  SLAVERY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
(2010); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTI-SLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
AMERICA, 1760–1848, at 16 (1977); SEAN WILENTZ, NO PROPERTY IN MAN:  SLAVERY AND 
ANTISLAVERY AT THE NATION’S FOUNDING 162–63 (2018); Howard A. Ohline, Slavery, 
Economics, and Congressional Politics, 1790, 46 J.S. HIST. 335 (1980). 
 5. See, e.g., 11 REG. DEB. 1464 (1835) (statement of Rep. Francis Jackson) (referring to 
men who “disclaim all interference, or disposition to interfere, with the rights of property in 
slaves, or control over the slave question, within the jurisdiction of the slave-holding States”); 
Republican Platform of 1860, reprinted in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1850–1956, at 31, 
32–33 (Donald B. Johnson & Kirk H. Porter eds., 2d ed. 1956); see also CONG. GLOBE, 36th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 568–576 (1860) (statement of Hon. Henry Wilson). 
 6. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by 
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 
499 (1842). 
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America, no one would interfere with the institution of slavery in the states 
where it existed.7 
Despite its prominence in the archival records, our understanding of how 
and why this doctrine emerged remains hazy at best.  To date, two different 
views stand out.  The first, and perhaps the most familiar, attributes the rule 
to the long-standing and deeply embedded practice of local self-governance 
under the British Empire.8  The second view counters that, far from simply 
the inevitable product of localism and faith in a limited central government, 
the rule is best understood as the product of a brokered sectional compromise 
in the early 1790s, as Northern congressmen set out to secure Southern votes 
for pending legislation.9  Working from these depictions of the doctrine as 
either an antiquated vestige of the colonial past or a one-off political 
compromise, recent scholarship has invited us to see the doctrine as one that, 
by midcentury, had devolved into political rhetoric, overshadowed by the rise 
of a powerful antislavery movement that looked to the power of the national 
government and seized on the Constitution’s underlying abolitionist 
potential.10 
This Essay offers a different origins story for the federal consensus, one 
that invites us to re-center its place in the founding constitutional order.  
Drawing on a model of inquiry that expands the conventional map of 
America’s founding to include the material modes of production and 
exchange, this Essay allows us to see how the principle of noninterference 
emerged not only from the oft cited vestiges of localism and sectionalism11 
but also from the customary practices and material realities of long-distance 
maritime trade in the Atlantic world.12 
As economic historians discovered nearly four years ago, long before the 
federal consensus first appeared in print in 1790, America’s merchants had 
forged a robust trading network along the extended Atlantic coastline, 
creating an interregional marketplace that linked the continent’s emerging 
urban and commercial centers of the northern latitudes to the agricultural 
zones of the southern latitudes and outer-lying islands of the Caribbean.13  
 
 7. Proclamation No. 17 (Emancipation Proclamation), 12 Stat. 1268 (1863); Abraham 
Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in POLITICAL SPEECHES AND DEBATES OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS 530 (Chicago, Scott, Foresman & Co. 1896). 
 8. See WIECEK, supra note 4, at 16; see also PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE 
FOUNDERS:  RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 104 (1996) (arguing that “the federal 
consensus” of 1780 “was already in place”). 
 9. Ohline, supra note 4, at 336. 
 10. See, e.g., Matt Karp, The Mass Politics of Antislavery, 3 CATALYST 131 (2019).  For 
a similar characterization of the doctrine as one that meant little in practice, see OAKES, supra 
note 4.  For the recent historiography that has sought to emphasize the antislavery and 
abolitionist nature of the Constitution, see WILENTZ, supra note 4.  For a related turn towards 
recovering the “abolitionist soul” in the Reconstruction Amendments, see Dorothy E. Roberts, 
Abolitionist Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 50 (2019) (“The abolitionist soul of the 
Reconstruction Amendments is experiencing a renaissance.”). 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Parts II–III. 
 13. ARTHUR L. JENSEN, THE MARITIME COMMERCE OF COLONIAL PHILADELPHIA (1963); 
William I. Davisson & Lawrence J. Bradley, New York Maritime Trade:  Ship Voyage 
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Although never as heavily trafficked as the transatlantic shipping lanes that 
connected the ports of America to the central metropolis of the British 
Empire, these lesser-known coastal conduits that spanned from the enclaves 
of Boston, to Charleston, to the West Indies contributed to the ongoing 
conceptualization and articulation of a defined economic space called 
America.  Dating back to the first exchanges of commodities between the 
Massachusetts Bay and the James River in the early 1630s, these networks 
rested on familiar mercantile practices of long-term contracting designed to 
endogenize trust and norms of reciprocity, including the foundational 
principle of noninterference with the modes of enslaved production on which 
the accumulation of white wealth and power in America increasingly 
depended.14 
Far from remaining confined to a silo of economic space, these norms and 
material realities of commercial partnership supplied a useful starting point 
for fashioning the rules that would govern relations between the newly 
created entities called united states.15  Most notably, when confronted in 
1790 with the claim that the Constitution’s Preamble conferred on Congress 
a power to abolish the institution of slavery, those who debated the question 
and codified the federal consensus in print drew on the logic of the old 
commercial American coast in two key ways.  First, rather than rebutting the 
claim of federal power with conventional constitutional arguments 
predicated exclusively on states’ rights and sectional political bargains, 
disputants who had come of age in an America where the territorial and 
institutional boundaries of states and sections had yet to take on today’s 
reified form described a fluid landscape of property owners engaged in 
commerce, collectively bound by shared interests in preserving the mode of 
enslaved production and ideologies of a racial caste hierarchy.16 
Second, working from this envisioned landscape of the American coast, 
disputants presented the proposed constitutional rule of noninterference not 
simply as a rule that governed relations between strangers but also as a rule 
 
Patterns, 1715–1765, 55 N.Y. HIST. SOC’Y Q. 309, 309 (1971); William I. Davisson, The 
Philadelphia Trade, 3 WESTERN ECON. J. 310 (1965); Albert Fishlow, Antebellum 
Interregional Trade Reconsidered, 54 AM. ECON. REV. 352, 362 (1974) (observing that 
although the corridor constituted the most “important artery of interregional commerce,” it is 
“one about which we know perhaps least”); Lawrence A. Herbst, Interregional Commodity 
Trade from the North to the South and American Economic Development in the Antebellum 
Period, 35 J. ECON. HIST. 264, 265 (1975); David C. Klingaman, The Coastwise Trade of 
Colonial Massachusetts, 108 ESSEX INST. HIST. COLLECTIONS 217 (1972) [hereinafter 
Klingaman, The Coastwise Trade of Colonial Massachusetts]; David C. Klingaman, The 
Development of the Coastwise Trade of Virginia in the Late Colonial Period, 77 VA. MAG. 
HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 26 (1969); Merl E. Reed, Footnote to the Coastwise Trade:  Some Teche 
Planters and Their Atlantic Factors, 8 LA. HIST. 191 (1967); James F. Shepherd & Samuel H. 
Williamson, The Coastal Trade of the British North American Colonies, 1768–1772, 32 J. 
ECON. HIST. 783 (1972). 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part II. 
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that governed relations between sharers.17  In particular, rather than 
describing the rule solely as the manifestation of an absolute, in rem right of 
an individual property owner to exclude all strangers for all time (including, 
say, the audience of citizen-petitioners who observed the congressional 
debates from the galleries), disputants also characterized the rule as one that 
governed consenting partners of the Atlantic coast:  partners who had long 
since agreed by mutual consent to forgo their right to interfere with the modes 
of production in the plantations in pursuit of the profits to be gained from a 
long-term commercial correspondence rooted in trust and reciprocity.18 
By translating the records of these legislative debates using the preexisting 
commercial lexicon of the coast, we can thus begin to better understand the 
material roots and logic of the federal consensus.  Far from simply a 
manifestation of colonial-era localism or a one-off political bargain between 
feuding sections, this was at its core a powerful legal doctrine that could be 
actively enforced through a thick set of social and relational norms:  whether 
it be via sanctions brought against future abolitionists who might endeavor 
to interfere with the institution of slavery or via regular informational 
exchanges between elected officials in the halls of Congress, where 
representatives of property owners who shared in the profits of enslavement 
had agreed to delegate managerial control over the institution of racial 
slavery to those who owned the land and labor of the plantations. 
In the end, then, restoring this economic space and its internal ordering 
mechanisms to the conventional map of America’s founding has two key 
implications for how we understand slavery’s constitution.  First, in terms of 
methodology, it invites us to ask a new set of questions.  Instead of continuing 
to relitigate the familiar questions as to where, as between center and 
periphery or as between North and South, power resided and when this 
allocation of power was fixed for all time, we might productively ask how 
older norms of commercial partnership interacted with newly emerging and 
evolving norms of constitutional governance.  Second, and more 
substantively, by encouraging us to explore how the resulting doctrine of 
noninterference functioned to mediate relations between strangers as well as 
sharers in the profits of racial enslavement, this shift invites us to see the 
doctrine not simply as a rhetorical rule of inaction but rather, as a profoundly 
consequential exercise of federal regulatory power that made possible the 
systematic enslavement of Black people for white profit. 
To begin the work of telling this story, this Essay commences in Part I with 
a cursory tour of the American coast and its underlying norms of partnership, 
as it existed prior to the creation of the U.S. Constitution.  Part II then 
explores how restoring this older world to the existing map of the coast’s 
political space can help us to better translate the records of legislative debate 
that gave rise to the codification of the federal consensus in 1790.  A caveat:  
 
 17. For the conceptual framing of property’s multiple audiences of strangers and sharers, 
see Thomas W. Merrill, Property and Sovereignty, Information and Audience, 18 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 417 (2017). 
 18. See infra Part II. 
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a full account of this history is beyond the scope of this brief Essay.  Instead, 
the aim here is simply to suggest how expanding the analytical frame can 
enrich our understanding of the origins and significance of the federal 
consensus. 
I.  AMERICA’S FOUNDING ECONOMIC SPACE:  PATHWAYS AND NORMS OF 
PARTNERSHIP 
In the waning decades of the British Empire’s rule in North America, the 
merchant ships of New England hauled out each week from Boston with the 
first fair winds, bound for the ports of the plantation coast.19  The largest 
among them could carry the annual yield of four rice plantations,20 rendering 
a single ship more than twice as valuable as a plantation boasting three 
thousand acres of Carolina soil.21  The smaller vessels among them could 
carry the full annual harvest of a single tobacco estate.22  Wide hulls and flat 
bottoms, broad sails and shallow draughts, many of the vessels were designed 
explicitly to go easily over the sandy bars that lined the southern coast to 
where the harvest waited—“a treasure,” one Bostonian later observed, 
“better than the mines of Peru.”23 
 
 19. See, e.g., Ship News, 5 ESSEX GAZETTE 85, 86 (1772); Custom-House, Port of Salem 
& Marblehead, Jan. 4, 5 ESSEX GAZETTE 89, 91 (1773); Salem January 12:  Custom-House, 
Port of Salem & Marblehead, Jan. 11, 5 ESSEX GAZETTE 93, 95 (1773). 
 20. This figure is based on estimated yields of rice plantations in the early 1760s and the 
carrying capacity of 180-ton ships. See Maurice A. Crouse, Gabriel Manigault:  Charleston 
Merchant, 101 S.C. HIST. MAG. 98, 103–04  (2000) (estimating that two of Gabriel Manigault’s 
rice plantations produced 707 barrels); see also Charles-Town, May 21, 1763., S.C. GAZETTE, 
May 21, 1763 (reporting that a 180-ton ship is thought to “carry 1100 barrels of rice”); Lynn 
Harris, Charleston’s Colonial Boat Culture, 1668–1775, at 161 (2002) (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of South Carolina) (on file with author) (estimating a four-to-one ratio of rice 
barrels to each ton of vessel weight). 
 21. See, e.g., Lynn Harris, Shipyards and European Shipbuilders in South Carolina (Late 
1600s to 1800) 3 (1999) (unpublished manuscript), https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=mrd_pubs [https://perma.cc/UB5M-XGBN] 
(calculating that the planter and merchant Henry Laurens valued his 3000-acre plantation on 
the Cooper River at 7000 pounds sterling and his one-quarter ownership in a ship at 4000 
pounds, for a total valuation of 16,000 pounds sterling). 
 22. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to Robert Cary & Co. (July 2, 1759), in 6 
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON:  COLONIAL SERIES 330, 330 (W. W. Abbott ed., 1988) 
(“By the Fair American . . . I send you fifteen Hhds Tobo the whole Amount of the Estates 
Crop this Year; one Hhd only excepted, which I could not get on board in time as it lay up 
Pamunky River.”). 
 23. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 89 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (“I suppose the New England States have a treasure offered to them better 
than the mines of Peru; and it cannot be to the disadvantage of the Southern States.”).  See 
London, August 10, NEW-ENGLAND WEEKLY J., Nov. 6, 1732; see also Imported in the Last 
Ships from London and to Be Sold, BOS. NEWS-LETTER, July 24, 1760; State of New-
Hampshire, INDEP. CHRON. & UNIVERSAL ADVERTISER (Bos.), Nov. 15, 1781; Wanted on Hire, 
N.H. GAZETTE, Nov. 9, 1770 (“Wanted on Hire, A Vessell . . . suitable for the Virginia or 
Carolina Trade.”); Letter from Joseph Gerrish & John Barrell to Chauncey Townsend (June 
14, 1738) (available in John Barrel, Letter Book, 1738–1760, on file with the New York 
Historical Society) (“What ships we design for Carolina to sail from Boston in the Month of 
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Unlike the wagons and trains that later crossed the continent and left 
behind a grid of roads and iron rails, these ships left no trace on the swells of 
the ocean and would soon disappear from the conventional map of America’s 
constitutional founding.24  Indeed, for a long time afterwards, accounts of 
colonial America would begin with an agrarian landscape defined by small 
farms and isolated peripheries, perhaps slowly coalescing into soon-to-be 
visible sections of an antislavery North and a proslavery South.25  Beginning 
in the 1960s, however, a group of economic historians, curious as to what 
happened along the waterways lining the rolling fields of farms and 
plantations, set out to compile the movement of the merchant ships.  Using 
the new invention of a computer, researchers tabulated ship data from the 
local customs offices and newspapers.26  Their work revealed a clearly 
defined maritime economic space, one marked by pathways of commercial 
partnership capable of linking the colonies together in what one scholar 
described as “gossamer webs stronger than hooks of steel.”27 
As historians who have explored these networks in more detail have 
shown, this economic space dates back to at least the 1630s, when planters 
in Virginia took stock of their surplus harvests and began to scan the coastline 
 
Sep with a Cargo Suitable for the West Indias, where they may have a Chance for a Freight or 
secure a Freight in the Spring.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Fishlow, supra note 13. 
 25. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:  A BIOGRAPHY 21 (2006) 
(“British North America grew up not as one continental legal entity but rather as juridically 
separate colonies founded over a span of many decades. . . .  before 1776 . . . [the colonies] 
were . . . as legally separate from one another as India and Ireland.”); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE 
LAW OF THE LAND:  A GRAND TOUR OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC 23 (2015) (analogizing 
the colonies to a “hub-and-spoke” model); JOHN WILLIAM BURGESS, THE MIDDLE PERIOD, 
1817–1858, at 41 (1897); JOHN WILLIAM BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons 1897); JOHN FISKE, THE CRITICAL 
PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1783–1789 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin & Co. 1888); JACK P. 
GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER ix (1986) (using an imperial framework featuring thirteen 
colonies as the periphery of an imperial metropolis in London); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE 
FRAMERS’ COUP:  THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 14 (2016) (noting that 
in 1776, “most people still thought of their state as their country.”); PETER S. ONUF, THE 
ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC:  JURISDICTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1775–1787, at 130 (1983) (identifying the “thirteen colony-states” as the “basic components 
of the American union”); FRANCIS AMASA WALKER, THE MAKING OF THE NATION, 1783–1817 
(New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons 1895); GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY:  A 
HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 2 (2009) (“Before the Revolution of 1776 
America had been merely a collection of disparate British colonies.”); GORDON WOOD, THE 
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 359 (1969) (reflecting on the fractured 
nature of the thirteen British colonies); Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Background of American 
Federalism, 12 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 215 (1918); John M. Murrin, A Roof Without Walls:  The 
Dilemma of American National Identity, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION:  ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 336 (Richard Beemen et al. eds., 1987) 
(arguing that “[t]he spectrum of seventeenth-century settlement produced, not one, but many 
Americas, and the passage of time threatened to drive them farther apart, not closer together”). 
 26. See infra Part II. 
 27. See 2 WILLIAM BABCOCK WEEDEN, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF NEW 
ENGLAND, 1620–1789, at 592 (1963). 
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that led northward for nearby markets.28  “The Planters are carried with a 
great forwardnes to seeke trade abroad, to which purpose we have now 7 or 
8 pinnaces & Barques bound to New-England & the Northward,” the 
governor of Virginia reported to London in 1631.29  Within two years, the 
region had produced ten thousand bushels of corn for export to “their zealous 
neighbours of New England,” he continued.30  In Massachusetts, meanwhile, 
colonizers who looked over the unforgiving soil that would prove incapable 
of sustaining a staple agricultural export crop began the work of building a 
merchant fleet that could carry the produce of the plantations in the Americas 
to the markets that would answer.  “We are in a way of building shippes,” 
the governor of Massachusetts reported in 1642.31  The “building of ships,” 
the lawmakers later declared, was “of great importance for the common 
good.”32 
Over the next century, this preliminary conduit that connected the enclaves 
of plantations along the James River to the shipyards of the Massachusetts 
Bay became a heavily trafficked corridor within the broader Atlantic world, 
weaving together the commercial and agricultural sectors of North 
America.33  By 1732, for example, a census of ships anchored in Roanoke, 
Virginia, found that nearly every other ship in the southern port was 
registered to a merchant in New England.34  Records from the port of New 
York, meanwhile, show that a third of all vessels between 1715 and 1765 had 
been cleared for a port along the American coast.35 
By the eve of the American Revolution, the corridor was crowded with 
ships carrying the produce of the plantations to market, as food deficits in 
New England led to increasing dependence on imports.36  During the first 
half of the 1760s, for example, planters in Virginia and Maryland supplied 
 
 28. See Benjamin Callender, A Correct Chart of the East Coast of North America 
(illustration) (1796), in CHARLES E. GOODSPEED COLLECTION (available at the Worcester Art 
Museum). 
 29. Robert C. Johnson, Virginia in 1632, 65 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 458, 466 
(1957). 
 30. Letter from Thomas Yong to Sir Tobie Matthew (Oct. 20, 1634), in 9 COLLECTIONS 
OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY ser. 4, at 81, 110 (Boston, Massachusetts 
Historical Society 1871). 
 31. New England’s First Fruits (Sept. 26, 1642), in 1 COLLECTIONS OF THE 
MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 248 (Boston, Monroe & Francis reprt. ed. 1806) 
(1792). 
 32. Acts to Promote the Building of Good Ships, &c (ch. 91), reprinted in THE CHARTERS 
AND GENERAL LAWS OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 189 (Boston, T.  
B. Wait & Co. 1814) (1671). 
 33. See Klingaman, The Coastwise Trade of Colonial Massachusetts, supra note 13, at 
222. 
 34. ALEX ROLAND ET AL., THE WAY OF THE SHIP:  AMERICA’S MARITIME HISTORY 
REENVISIONED, 1600–2000, at 73 (2007). 
 35. Davisson & Bradley, supra note 13, at 314 (finding that, of the 2962 vessels recorded 
in colonial records between 1715 and 1765, 849 cleared out for a port in the “American Coastal 
Region”). 
 36. David Klingaman, Food Surpluses and Deficits in the American Colonies, 1768–1772, 
31 J. ECON. HIST. 563 (1971) (“New England had probably been a net importer of foodstuffs 
since early in the eighteenth century and by the 1760’s was dependent on external supply 
sources for her marginal requirements in corn, wheat, and meat.”). 
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78.9 percent of the corn and wheat imports for Massachusetts, while South 
Carolina planters provided Massachusetts with 80 percent of its total rice 
imports37 and North Carolina supplied 95 percent of Massachusetts’s 
coastwise tar and turpentine imports necessary for the colony’s booming 
shipbuilding industry.38  During the same five-year period, approximately 70 
percent of sugar exported from Massachusetts was purchased by 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland, while 88 percent of the salt exported 
from the West Indies went to the three southern colonies of Virginia, North 
Carolina, and Maryland.39 
In addition to generating profits for the merchants and planters who owned 
the ships and lands along the American coast, this flourishing coastwise trade 
contributed to the emergence of an ordering of the commercial space of 
America quite different from the familiar landscape of isolated colonial 
outposts and latent sections.40  As a return to the official reports and merchant 
correspondence reveals, the movement of commodities across jurisdictional 
borders contributed to a way of speaking about America in which these 
bordered lines that have held center stage could recede into the backdrop of 
commercial speech, as a landscape of interjurisdictional exchange, 
predicated on internal norms of trust and reciprocity, came to the foreground. 
To see how this commercial lexicon of America emerged, consider first 
the corpus of navigational texts and sea charts produced to facilitate 
movement along the coast.  As these texts attest, the land that appears in 
leading constitutional histories today as one defined by political and 
jurisdictional spaces could also appear as part of an organic, smoothly hewn 
wedge.41  “New England is that part of America in the Ocean Sea opposite 
to Noua Alybon,” a captain describing the American coast had announced in 
1616, and readers could imagine the way the land must have appeared to him 
from under the shade of a full sail on a summer morning.42  “New France, 
off it, is Northward,” he continued, and you could perhaps see the captain 
nodding over his shoulder.43  “Southwardes is Virginia and all the adjoyning 
Continent,” he continued, introducing his readers to a single coast that 
seemed to have no beginning and no end.44 
Those engaged in the work of overseeing the movement of ships along this 
single sweep of coastline, meanwhile, presented the ports that began to 
appear not simply as peripheral spokes on a wheel centered in a distant 
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metropolis of London but also as entities linked to one another via the 
accumulation of commodities.  “Virginia is now become the granary of all 
His Majesty’s northern colonies,” Governor John Harvey reported in 1634, 
describing the colonies in economic relation to one another.45  “Boston [is] 
the store of all the plantation commodities,” retorted another official in 1690, 
once more offering a spoken geography of America in which commodities 
moved across jurisdictional borders to accumulate in a single port.46 
One could hear the same organization of space in the accounts that 
merchants offered as they described the bustling trade that connected these 
ports, presenting the names of America’s colonies according to the 
geographic order in which a ship might sail down the coast and back again.  
“Many of our ships go to Virginia, No and So Carolina,” a merchant in Boston 
reported in 1763, verbally arranging the coast by following the movement of 
a ship traveling northward to southward, before turning to the cargos the 
ships carried:  “[L]arge quantities of rum and other northern produce to 
purchase rice, tobacco, and naval stores and take in freight for Great 
Britain.”47  Others described the coast in geographic reverse, beginning with 
the southernmost islands and then ranging back home northward:  “[t]he 
West Indias, South Carolina, Cape Fear, Virginia and Greenland . . . these 
Places are the Ways by which we Generally Make our Remittance from New 
England,” one trader observed to his partner in London in 1738, in which 
names of colonies could appear interchangeably alongside names of capes 
and islands and regions, all under the broad, undifferentiated category of 
capitalized “Places” and capitalized “Ways.”48 
In that land of movement along the American coast in the broader Atlantic 
world, references to sectional blocks of north and south routinely gave to talk 
of traveling to the northward and the southward,49 of vessels that ought to be 
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kept “constantly running, backward & forward”50 and “swimming 
Nor’wardly”51 from the plantations of Virginia to the ports of Massachusetts.  
There was a “swarm of Northward Men . . . in the River,” the Virginia planter 
Benjamin Harrison observed to his business correspondent William Palfrey 
in Massachusetts in 1772, peering down at the James River.52  The port of 
Charleston, another merchant reported in 1763, “is glutted with all kinds of 
Northern commodities,”53 owing perhaps, as the newspapers later reported, 
to the “Rhode Islanders who come loaded with Rum and Small Truck . . . and 
carry back Rice.”54 
The captains who navigated the ships along these routes spoke in the same 
vernacular, folding the land into a sea of movement, shaped by the winds and 
the currents.  “I had but got very little to the Southward and aimed to bear 
away for Virginia,” one captain on a trading voyage reported, “until meeting 
with a Calm in the Gulph Stream, it carried me so far to the Northward, that 
I fetch’d but in with your capes, where I met the Wind at W.S.W., and ordered 
the Vessel about to go to the Southward for Virginia.”55  At a time when such 
voyages were at the whim of the elements, overland distances between the 
ports could collapse, with one planter in Virginia predicting that the voyage 
between Boston and the James River was shorter than that between Boston 
and Philadelphia.56 
Indeed, by the eve of the Revolution, it became possible to speak of the 
coast as a single unit of production.  “We should be glad of your Advice, 
when you write us—what articles The Produce of this Country would serve 
for an export,” a merchant in Newburyport wrote to his friend in London in 
1768, offering up any of the various commodities that his ships could collect 
from the entrepôts to the southward and bring to London,57 whether it be 
flour from the Delaware River, tobacco from the James River, or rice and 
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indigo from the Carolinas.58  Trading houses abroad, meanwhile, responded 
with increasingly formalized sheets of paper listing the going prices for the 
“Products of your Continent,”59 as a category of “American Produce,”60 
emerged in print.  Men spoke of ships traveling to “[t]his Part of the 
World,”61 “this quarter of the world,”62 or “any part of the Globe,”63 while 
expressing hopes and confidence of an “intercourse from this place to that 
place.”64 
This flourishing movement of ships and commodities that had helped 
make it possible to conceptualize an economic space called America rested 
on a vast trading network that spanned from Boston to the West Indies and 
across the Atlantic.  Built on much older practices and principles of 
commercial exchange,65 this was a trading network that had emerged to 
mitigate the enormous logistical and informational challenges of engaging in 
long-distance maritime trade in the early modern world.66  Preserved in the 
records of the leading trading houses of the American coast, this was a 
network that connected merchants in port cities to planters who owned the 
land and labor of the coast, as well as to the third-party commission agents 
who acted as intermediaries.67 
In its early iteration, this network was primarily limited to correspondents 
who were related by kin, gradually expanding to include those who had been 
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vetted by existing members.68  Originating out of familial connections, the 
rules that governed correspondents who participated in the trade did not 
appear in any statute book.  As one leading architect of the new republic later 
put it, “Merchants of eminence will tell you, that they can trust their 
correspondents without law; but they cannot trust the laws of the state in 
which their correspondents live.”69 
Instead, at the heart of this correspondence network that existed “without 
law” lay the principle of mutual advantage:  an expectation that any joint 
venture would generate mutual returns for the parties involved.  When, for 
example, a young merchant in Newburyport drafted a letter to a commission 
house in Philadelphia, he began with his hopes of establishing a 
“[c]orrespondence for our mutual benefit.”70  Writing from the southward, a 
merchant in Virginia recited the same phrase to a merchant in Providence, 
Rhode Island, expressing his hope “of an advantageous Correspondence to 
us both.”71  In earl 1777, meanwhile, a merchant in Boston penned a note to 
his friend in Charleston, South Carolina, introducing a fellow merchant in 
Portsmouth, Virginia, with the hope of “the beginning of a Correspondence 
mutually profitable & agreeable.”72  And on the eve of peace, a merchant in 
Baltimore, Maryland, wrote to a correspondent in Boston, expressing hopes 
of inaugurating “some mercantile transactions . . . that may operate to our 
reciprocal advantage.”73 
In the pursuit of realizing these mutual profits, correspondents were 
expected to share market information that, in turn, helped to promote trust 
while also allowing each party a basis on which to decide whether and how 
to proceed with any given venture.  “[P]ermit me to ask how Flour of a good 
quality would Sell in London?,”74 one planter inquired of his commission 
agent, before peppering him with questions ranging from the cost of freight 
to the commission fee.75  “I Shall . . . be much obliged to be often Informd 
of your Prices for Bread, Flower, Corn, Barr & Pig Iron . . . Rum, Molasses 
Loaf & Muscovado Sugars, Candles, Prk etc.,” William Lux of Baltimore 
wrote to a friend in Boston in July of 1768, observing that “Distance of miles 
does not Create distance of Sentiments.”76  Such market information could 
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also be volunteered.  “We are starving for want of provisions,” a merchant in 
Charleston wrote to his correspondent in Newburyport in 1766, and “are 
much in want of your country produce—not one Potatoe yet from the 
northward.”77  Charleston “is glutted with all kinds of Northern 
commodities,” one correspondent warned his partner in Boston, whom he 
encouraged to find something else to ship.78 
Perhaps of most consequence, in addition to sharing market information, 
correspondents were expected to exercise their best judgment and make 
business decisions that would advance the interests of their partners.  Owing 
to the physical geographies that separated correspondents from one another 
and the intricacies of doing business in any given jurisdiction, merchants 
routinely deferred to the decisions of their correspondents.  As one merchant 
put it, a correspondent “cannot at that distance give his orders with such 
precision as they could wish, they must leave a great deal to my Prudence.”79  
In practice, this meant that merchants engaged in commerce along the 
American coast regularly agreed not to interfere with the business decisions 
of their partners, preferring instead to appeal to their shared interests in 
generating a profit from carrying the commodities of the coast to market.  
“Gent.,” one merchant in Newburyport wrote to his correspondents in 
Philadelphia, “I will leave it to your discretion & as you would act for 
yourselves, act for me.”80  Working under this delegation of broad discretion, 
correspondents routinely assured each other that they had taken all efforts to 
protect and advance the material interests of the other party.  “All that we can 
further say is, that every thing has been done for your Interest that was in our 
power & that we shall continue so to act until the business is completed,” 
Henry Laurens, a merchant in Charleston and a future president of the 
Continental Congress, wrote to his correspondents in Providence, Rhode 
Island.81  “I have acted for him, as I would in the same situation wish him to 
so for me,” echoed William Lux of Baltimore.82 
Guided by these foundational principles of a correspondence predicated on 
the promise of mutual advantage and delegated decision-making authority, 
merchants in the New England region who engaged in direct correspondence 
with planters abided by a tacit, at times explicit, agreement that decisions 
regarding the enslaved labor force upon which their joint profits rested 
remained entirely under the management of the plantation’s ownership.  As 
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their correspondence suggests, merchants and planters instead confined the 
topic of their business correspondence to the exchange of market information 
and the logistics of any given venture, with only occasional reference to the 
lives and labor of those held in bondage under local laws of property. 
Consider, for example, the letters exchanged between William Palfrey, a 
Boston merchant who served as a clerk to the future president of the Second 
Continental Congress, and Benjamin Harrison V, a Virginia planter who 
became a signer of the Declaration of Independence.  In a northward-
southward correspondence that spanned multiple years, these participants in 
the coastal trade, who later assumed leadership roles in the new republic, 
shared and solicited information as to the supply and demand for various 
grain commodities, without engaging in discussions about the underlying 
modes of enslaved production.  “I am the best provided . . . of any man in 
this Country,” wrote Harrison to Palfrey in July of 1768,83 and there was no 
mention of the 110 people whom Harrison held imprisoned as an enslaved 
labor force.84  “I shall be glad of your advice as often as convenient of the 
state of your market,” Harrison continued, following the familiar script by 
which correspondents exchanged market information for mutual 
advantage.85  “The first opportunity I have I shall ship you a quantity of Bread 
& Flour, we have the Largest and best Crop of Wheat ever known in the 
Country,” he promised.86  “I hope you have received my letter by your sloop 
with the bread and flour,” he wrote, and once again, the ships and their cargos 
appeared untethered from the land upon which the commerce rested.87 
The same bracketing of the institution of racial slavery appeared in letters 
that traveled between Palfrey and the mayor of Williamsburg, Virginia.  “I 
am further obliged to you for your endeavor to assist me in the sale of Flour,” 
the mayor, William Holt, wrote to Palfrey,88 and there was no reference to 
the ten enslaved people whom the mayor held in bondage.89  “I tried to get 
181 for your Tobacco,” he continued; and notice how a Massachusetts 
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merchant became the holder of a commodity grown by enslaved people on 
the banks of the southern plantation coast.90 
This tacit agreement among correspondents to accept the underlying 
modes of enslaved production and focus instead on ensuring the smooth 
exchange of commodities for profit could also appear explicitly.  Consider, 
for example, a letter dispatched by William Byrd II, in Westover, Virginia, 
to his colleague in Salem, Massachusetts.91  Remembered by historians today 
as a rapist and sadist who described in remarkable detail the gruesome 
violence he wrought on the Black children and women whom he enslaved,92 
Byrd had taken it upon himself to write to his Massachusetts correspondent 
to report an incident involving a crew from a New England cargo ship who 
had dropped anchor near Byrd’s waterfront plantation in the Tidewater.  
“Some of these Banditti anchor near my estate,” he wrote his friend in 
Salem.93  They had come, he continued, “for the advantage of traffiquing 
with my slaves, from whom they are sure to have good Penny worths.”94  For 
Byrd, this interference with the rights of his claimed property was 
inexcusable.  Rather than risking a direct confrontation with the crew 
members whom he accused of having trespassed on his claimed personal 
property, Byrd instead asked that his correspondent intervene to see to it that 
such interferences did not happen again.95  “I would you would be so kind as 
to hang up all your Felons at home, and not send them abroad to discredit 
their country in this manner,” he wrote, appealing to his correspondent to 
ensure that a long-standing principle of noninterference became a 
prerequisite for future movement along the American coast.96 
When correspondents did discuss the enslaved labor that lay at the heart of 
the plantation economy, one could sometimes see hints of a racial caste order 
that traversed the coast’s jurisdictional borders.  Return again to the 
correspondence between Harrison, the Virginia planter who would sign his 
name to the Declaration of Independence, and Palfrey, the Massachusetts 
clerk of the future president of the Second Continental Congress.97  In a 
folded letter that traveled between the two future leaders in the summer of 
1772, Harrison told the story of a cargo ship that had recently arrived from 
Newport, Rhode Island, at the end of his private dock on the James River.98  
The ship, the planter explained, carried a “consignment of Negroes”; a 
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consignment, he continued, that his son had ordered from Rhode Island.99  
The letter told of how the ship’s captain, who was also a part owner in the 
vessel and feeling unwell, was invited to come ashore and follow the path 
that led up from the dock to rest in Harrison’s estate that looked over the river 
below.100  The letter, as was custom, made no reference to the Black people 
who remained on the ship at the end of the planter’s dock in the suffocating 
July heat, their lives instead dismissed under the abstract reference to a 
“consignment of Negroes.”101  Nor, moreover, was there reference to the 
name of the young Black girl whom the ship captain had allowed his first 
mate to sell to the planter’s overseer.102  Instead, the letter spoke only of the 
smallpox that the ship’s captain had brought to the “Crop Negroes,” whose 
suffering was of relevance to the conversation only for what it might mean 
for the prospects of next year’s harvest and the joint profits of their future 
ventures.103 
Taken together, these archival fragments invite us to consider how the 
daily movement of cargo ships along the American coast rested not only on 
an agreement among correspondents to defer to the underlying laws and 
practices of property in persons but also on a shared lexicon that traversed 
jurisdictional borders and reduced Black people to consignments of 
collective commodities.  By the eve of the Revolution, these underlying 
norms of noninterference with the institution of racial slavery had been in 
place for at least a century, kept afloat in a corpus of commercial 
correspondence in which America could appear not as a coast of fragments 
but as a single smoothly hewn wedge of soil, in which those who owned the 
ships and the land and the labor had reached a tacit agreement that the pursuit 
of mutual advantage rested on noninterference with the institution of 
enslavement upon which white wealth rested. 
II.  THE FIRST CONGRESS:  CODIFYING A DUTY OF NONINTERFERENCE 
In the opening months of 1790, while the merchant ships along the old 
American coast continued to sail, the lawmakers of the new nation assembled 
for the second session of the First Congress.104  At the time, basic questions 
about the newly created political space of the United States remained 
unsettled.  To begin with, none of the Constitution’s named institutions of 
governance had secured a firm physical foothold in the soil.105  Congress, for 
example, had yet to find a permanent institutional home, such that it appeared 
in a contemporary drawing as a ship, descending along the Atlantic coast in 
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search of a place where its representatives could meet to exchange 
information.106  States, meanwhile, remained similarly indeterminate, with 
legal identities that remained an object of considerable debate and territorial 
borders that were often at best only vaguely defined.107  The situation was 
little better in the executive branch, where the question as to what title to use 
to address the president of the United States had inspired months of 
acrimonious debate.108 
Paralleling these basic questions surrounding the ontological nature of the 
Constitution’s institutional structures lay a substantive question of 
constitutional law:  whether the new federal government had acquired any 
powers with regard to the institution of slavery.  As recent scholarship has 
helped illuminate, almost immediately following the ratification of the 
document, prominent abolitionists along the American coast seized on the 
possibility that the Constitution held within it an implied federal power to 
abolish the institution of slavery.109  Among those who were at the helm of 
this initiative was the Pennsylvania Abolitionist Society, whose members 
began drafting a petition to Congress in early 1790.110  Signed by the 
society’s president, Benjamin Franklin, the petition argued that although the 
power to abolish slavery was not among the enumerated powers in Article I, 
the Constitution’s Preamble contained language that, at least on one reading, 
vested the federal government with power to emancipate those held in 
bondage.111  As the petition explained, “The[] [petitioners] have observed 
with great Satisfaction that many important and salutary Powers are vested 
in you for ‘promoting the Welfare and securing the blessings of liberty to the 
People of the United States.’”112  From these powers, they argued, it followed 
that it was reasonable to expect that “nothing which can be done [by 
Congress] . . . will be either omitted or delayed,” in ensuring “that these 
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blessings ought rightfully to be administered, without distinction of Colour, 
to all descriptions of People.”113 
According to the conventional frame of analysis that commentators have 
used to analyze the subsequent debates that gave rise to the doctrine of 
noninterference,114 we might expect to see any number of responses to this 
call for federal action.  On the one hand, we might expect to find a debate 
that sounded in the register of sovereign states seeking to protest the 
encroachment of a distant central government or perhaps, one premised on 
brokered compromises between two emerging Northern and Southern 
regional blocks.  And to be sure, elements of states’ rights and sectional 
compromises appear throughout the records.115  But as this part argues, 
participants in the newly created U.S. Congress did not confine themselves 
to the reified blocks of jurisdictional space and sectional space that have 
preoccupied historians’ attention.  Instead, those whose words were 
transcribed, recorded, and ultimately published in newspapers and pamphlets 
across the new republic spoke of an America in the language of the coast, in 
which the commercial partnerships born of the exigencies of the soil and 
based on principles of mutual advantage and discretionary authority supplied 
a crucial justification for the legal relations between the newly united states. 
To observe this mode of constitutional discourse that began with the coast 
and its existing principles of partnership, we can begin by analyzing one of 
the published speeches from the debates, penned by Representative William 
Loughton Smith, an influential lawyer from South Carolina whose words 
appeared in newspaper coverage of the proceedings.116  Hailing from an elite 
family in Charleston, South Carolina, Smith was familiar with the 
commercial networks and conduits that linked the planters and their agents 
to the merchants of the northward and abroad.117  From the outset of the 
debates, Smith had insisted that no one in Congress seriously considered the 
possibility that the Constitution gave the federal government power to 
interfere with the institution.  As Smith wrote to Edward Rutledge on 
February 13, 1790, “[t]he Members who wished a commitment [of the 
petition] have assured me that it was done purely out of a compliment to the 
Petitioners & that they are sensible the House cannot in any respect 
interfere.”118  In an effort to clarify and settle this shared norm that the 
“House cannot in any respect interfere,” Smith began drafting a formal 
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opinion, which he presented to the House of Representatives on March 17 in 
the form of a speech, later reprinted for public audiences.119 
The first thing to note about Smith’s opinion explaining why Congress had 
no power to interfere in the institution of slavery is his construction of the 
relevant constitutional landscape.  Rather than remaining confined to a 
constitutional landscape defined by thirteen states, two feuding sections, and 
one central government, Smith offered readers a verbal portrait of the old 
American coastline, as defined by the nature of the land and the movement 
of the ships that hauled in from the northward to carry the produce of the 
plantations to market.  In his exposition, Smith called on his colleagues to 
consider the “nature of the soil” along the plantation coast.120  This soil, he 
insisted, was one that could only be cultivated by enslaved labor.121  “Indigo, 
cochineal, and various other dying materials, which are the produce of the 
West Indies, could only be raised by the slaves; the great staple commodities 
of the South would be annihilated without the labor of Slaves,” Smith 
asserted.122  From these staple commodities, Smith then turned to the 
networks of commerce that depended on the labor of the enslaved.  “If the 
low country is deserted,” Smith hypothesized, “where will be the commerce, 
the valuable exports of that country, the large revenue raised from its imports 
and from the consumption of the rich planters?”123  Moving from this 
interconnected network of the merchants and planters of America, Smith then 
warned of the dangers that would result if the chains of commerce were 
broken between the northward and the southward.  “The States are links of 
one chain:  if we break one, the whole must fall to pieces,” he declared.124  
“If you injure the Southern States, the injury would reach our Northern and 
Eastern brethren.”125 
In presenting this spoken portrait of an interlinked internal economy of 
America whose stakeholders shared an interest in the underlying modes of 
production, Smith tapped into a well-established tradition of political thought 
that had long emphasized the importance of commerce as the basis for a 
thriving society.126  At a time when the legal concept of a “united state” 
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remained inchoate, politicians looked to the realm of long-distance 
commerce for norms on which to build an enduring and long-lasting polity, 
abiding by a belief in commerce as the primary means of sociability.127 
This theoretical importance of the commercial pathways along the 
American coast had been brought into sharp material relief by the economic 
crises of the 1780s, as it became clear to many merchants in New England 
that their counterparts in Great Britain were determined to monopolize the 
carrying of plantation commodities to the markets of Europe.  “Great-Britain 
is endeavouring, by every means in her power, to annihilate [the carrying 
trade],” one observer had reported in Providence, Rhode Island.128  She was 
“depriving our ships of the privilege of carrying the produce of our own 
country,” while the “subjects of that nation are permitted to send their vessels 
to any part of the continent for bread, flour, tobacco, rice, &c. and to ship 
them from most of the States upon the same terms with our own subjects.”129  
The burden, some said, fell squarely on the New England merchants and 
property owners, who could appear in print as a unit interchangeable with the 
newly created New England states.  “Of all people,” wrote one observer in 
New York, “I pity the New-England States most.  Their commerce is good 
for nothing on the present plan.  Independence at present is no blessing to 
them in the way of trade; for from the regulations of Great-Britain they can 
have little or none of the carrying business.”130 
By appealing directly to these established traditions of political thought 
and assertions of economic necessity, Smith and his colleagues who conjured 
up an image of the old American coast seized on the opportunity presented 
by the petition to lay out the legal basis of noninterference with the institution 
of slavery.  In doing so, they offered two distinct justifications for the 
doctrine of noninterference, both of which rested on conceptualizing the 
newly created sovereign states not simply as peripheries to the central 
government or subparts of feuding sections but as individual property owners 
who had been engaged in interjurisdictional commercial exchange along the 
American coast for generations. 
The first of these justifications rested on the familiar principle that property 
owners had a right to exclude nonowners.131  One could hear this principle 
come alive in the early days of the debate, as disputants readily analogized 
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the sovereign states to individual property owners asserting their right to 
exclude unwanted strangers.  When, for example, Smith first set out in 
February of 1790 to explain why the House should refuse to accept the 
abolitionists’ petition, he invited his audience to consider an individual 
property owner who had traveled up from the plantation coast, passed 
through Philadelphia, and made his way to New York, only to find strangers 
in the gallery who sought to meddle with his claims of enslaved property in 
clear violation of the duty of noninterference.  “A gentleman can hardly come 
from that country with a servant or two, either to this place or Philadelphia, 
but there are persons trying to seduce his servants to leave,” Smith began.132  
The rule to be applied in such scenarios was simple.  “[T]hey should . . . not 
interfere with a business in which they are not interested.”133  Others 
concurred.  “The men in the gallery had come here to meddle in a business 
with which they have nothing to do,” observed Congressman Aedanus Burke 
of South Carolina.134 
While disputants had little difficulty applying this in rem rule of exclusion 
to the mass of unknown strangers who might descend on the enslavers of the 
American coast, Smith and his colleagues also offered a second justification:  
one that began with the premise that property owners who had a pecuniary 
interest in the institution of slavery had a right to weigh in on the future of 
the institution.  To hear this starting premise, listen, for example, as 
Congressman John Page of Virginia began his remarks.  Before speaking on 
the merits of the institution, Page clarified that he had a right to speak by 
virtue of his economic interest in the business of slavery.  As he explained 
by way of a preface, “he . . . was as much interested in the business as any 
gentleman in South Carolina or Georgia,” before announcing his judgment 
of the matter.135  Applying the same principles, Congressman James Jackson 
of Georgia observed that if the strangers in the galleries who had presented 
the petition also had the funds to purchase the property in question, then of 
course they would have the right to speak on the matter of slavery.  “I would 
beg to ask those, then, who are desirous of freeing the negroes, if they have 
funds sufficient to pay for them?  If they have, they may come forward on 
the business with some propriety; but, if they have not, they should keep 
themselves quiet.”136 
Set against this background understanding that interested parties, but not 
strangers, had a right to “come forward,” Smith and his colleagues framed 
the federal rule of noninterference in a way that would have resonated with 
those along the coast who had participated in the trade for generations.  More 
specifically, instead of simply presenting the doctrine of noninterference as 
a bright-line rule among strangers—a justification that would have made 
little sense to the close-knit merchant community who had engaged in 
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commercial exchange along the coast for over a century and a half—Smith 
and his colleagues also framed the rule of noninterference as one that 
emerged from the informed and willing consent of partners bound in links of 
mutual dependence.137 
Consider, for example, how Smith characterized the nature of the legal 
relationship between the states.  Rather than analogizing the states to the 
strangers in the room who were in need of a bright-line rule of 
noninterference, Smith honed in on the informed citizens of the Northern 
states who understood the importance of the institution of slavery to the 
political economy and knowingly acquiesced in its preservation.138  “The 
truth was,” Smith explained, 
that the best informed part of the citizens of the Northern States knew that 
slavery was so ingrafted into the policy of the Southern states, that it could 
not be eradicated without tearing up by the roots their happiness, tranquility 
and prosperity; that if it were an evil, it was one for which there was no 
remedy, and therefore, like wise men, they acquiesced in it.139 
Having directed his audience’s attention to the “best informed part of the 
citizens,”140 Smith then cited the act of informed acquiescence as the basis 
for a compact of noninterference:  “There was then an implied compact 
between the Northern and Southern people that no step should be taken to 
injure the property of the latter, or to disturb their tranquility.”141  The result, 
he continued, was that those deemed to be in the best position to regulate the 
institution of slavery were assured full discretionary authority over its 
governance.  “[The Southern States] were the only proper judges of what was 
for their interest,” he explained, invoking the familiar logic of the American 
coast.142  Based on this agreed upon compact, he concluded, “no other State 
had any right to intermeddle with her policy or laws.”143 
In presenting this justification for noninterference, Smith had thus rooted 
the federal consensus not simply in today’s familiar logic of a state’s 
primordial autonomy from a distant center or a regional compromise between 
sections but in an older logic of commercial partnership rooted in the promise 
of mutual advantage and discretionary authority between coequal parties to 
a long-term agreement.  Perhaps even more strikingly, Smith also made 
explicit the underlying ideology of racial ordering that had coursed through 
the merchant correspondence of the coast for generations.  Appealing directly 
to biological constructs of race, Smith argued that failure to abide by this 
implied compact of noninterference would not only destroy the profits on 
which the property owners of America depended; it would destroy the future 
of the white race.  “A proper consideration of this business,” he advised, 
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must convince every candid mind, that emancipation would be attended 
with one or other of these consequences; either that a mixture of the races 
would degenerate the whites, without improving the blacks, or that it would 
create two separate classes of people in the community . . . which would 
terminate in the massacre and extirpation of one or the other.144 
By invoking this prospect of the “degeneration” of the white race and 
warning of the ensuing violence that would result in the absence of 
enslavement, Smith thus concluded his defense of the foundational rule of 
noninterference not with appeals to states’ rights or sectional compromises 
but to an ideology of whiteness and racial subjugation that could course 
across the formal jurisdictional and sectional lines of America. 
Grounded in a constitutional landscape that featured a single organic 
American coastline bound by underlying norms of commercial partnership 
and a racial hierarchy of whiteness, Smith’s opinion found a ready audience.  
Throughout the debates, men who had come of age along the American 
coastline moved easily between speaking of the well-settled rights of 
individual property owners and the still inchoate sovereign rights.  In doing 
so, they, like Smith, borrowed from the familiar rules of strangers and sharers 
to articulate what would become the rule of noninterference for a union of 
states as commercial partners.  “The rights of the Southern States ought not 
to be threatened, and their property endangered, to please people who would 
be unaffected by the consequences,” announced Burke, working from the 
premise that strangers could not interfere with property rights.145  Likewise, 
when Congressman Abraham Baldwin referred to the question of property 
holdings in the compact of the Confederation, he too spoke in the language 
of the coast, warning that failure to abide by the careful agreements that had 
been enacted would compromise the entire venture: 
[F]rom the extreme desire of preserving the Union, and obtaining an 
efficient Government, [the members of the Southern States] were induced 
mutually to concede, and the Constitution jealously guarded what they 
agreed to.  If gentlemen look over the footsteps of that body, they will find 
the greatest degree of caution used to imprint them, so as not to be easily 
eradicated; but the moment we go to jostle on that ground, I fear we shall 
feel it tremble under our feet.146 
By no means limited to delegates from the Southern states, congressmen 
from the northward who had long participated in the political economy of the 
coast readily applied the same framework, presenting Congress as an 
assembly of states, each bound by a duty of noninterference that could be 
analogized to individual property owners.  Listen, for example, to how the 
merchant Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts explained the scope of the right 
of Congress’s power to purchase the population of enslaved people in the 
Southern states.  Rather than analyzing the question according to a contest 
between center and periphery or North versus South, Gerry presented 
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Congress as a composite of states that collectively had the right to make an 
offer to buy enslaved persons, a right no different than the individual 
petitioners who had assembled in the audience.  “Congress have a right, if 
they see proper,” he advised, “to make a proposal to the Southern States to 
purchase the whole of them.”147  Speaking of Congress in the plural, he 
continued:  “He did not intend to suggest a measure of this kind; he only 
instanced these particulars to show that Congress certainly has a right to 
intermeddle in the business.”148 
As intelligible to the planters of the southward as it was to these merchants 
of the northward, this principle of noninterference that had long coursed 
through the commercial records of the old American coast now appeared in 
the codified records of the Congress of the United States.  In lieu of justifying 
the principle with appeals to states’ rights or sectional political bargains, the 
authors of the final committee report simply declared what some presumed 
to have been obvious from the start.149  “Congress have no authority to 
interfere in the emancipation of slaves, or in the treatment of them within any 
of the States,” the final report read, “it remaining with the several States alone 
to provide any regulations therein, which humanity and true policy may 
require.”150  For many observers, this rule that codified the practices of the 
coast was hardly a surprise.  “Such things” as a federal abolition power, 
observed James Madison, “are not contemplated by any gentleman.”151  
Others concurred.  “I believe there is not a wish of the kind entertained by 
any member of this body that Congress intend to exercise an unconstitutional 
authority, in order to violate their rights,” echoed another.152  Rooted in the 
material realities and long-established norms of commercial partnership of 
the old Atlantic coast, this principle of noninterference had washed ashore 
into the records of Congress, as the ships down at the harbor continued to 
sail, carrying the produce of the plantations to market. 
CONCLUSION 
Long after the debates of the First Congress had concluded in the spring 
of 1790 and the ink on the House report had dried, legal scholars in America’s 
first law schools began to divide up the American coast into discrete units of 
constitutional time and space.153  As familiar today as the flag itself, this is a 
conceptual map that has cast a long shadow across the field, one that 
accentuates the founding era’s fragments by featuring isolated peripheries 
whose only bond was that of deference to a distant central government and 
whose competing labor systems would soon splinter into sections.  Working 
from this familiar map, scholars have tended to read the federal consensus as 
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either the lingering vestige of colonial-era parochialism or a one-time 
political bargain designed to help secure votes for pending legislation. 
This Essay has invited us to peer beyond this inherited map of America’s 
founding and expand the analytical lens.  By sketching out the possibilities 
of a constitutional landscape that encompasses the economic space of the 
American coast, I have suggested how a more expansive archive can both 
enrich our understanding of the norms of commercial partnership as well as 
sharpen our tradition of the norms of constitutional partnership that appeared 
in the formal records of Congress.  In doing so, this more expansive archive 
invites us to see how the doctrine of noninterference that allowed slavery in 
America to flourish across the nineteenth century traced its most enduring 
roots not to a land of isolated fragments and feuding sections but to a much 
older America, one predicated on the promise of mutual advantage from and 
noninterference with the institution of racial slavery and the atrocities upon 
which it rested.   
